




WATER IS THICKER THAN BLOOD 





As many countries have entered into privatisation schemes, the question of how and when 
privatisation can be successful is becoming increasingly important. Privatisation of water 
services has been a controversial and important discussion in the world since the 1980s, so 
also in South Africa. The aim of this thesis is to further examine the factors behind a 
municipality’s decision to privatise and the subsequent effect on access to piped water and 
tariff level using cross-sectional data. The probability of privatisation has been evaluated 
using the Probit model and Ordinary Least Squares-method has been used to evaluate the 
subsequent effect of privatisation on access to piped water and tariff level. The results show 
that a privatisation decision might be influenced by employment rate. No evidence can be 
found of privatisation having any impact on infrastructure coverage or tariff level. Further 
research needs to be conducted to obtain results valid outside the scope of the sample. 
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The debate on water privatisation has been vivid; however, a regulated collaboration  
between the public and the private sector is believed to increase efficiency. The main 
objective of this study is to analyse the factors influencing a South African municipality’s 
decision to privatise its water services and how such a decision influences access to piped 
water and tariff level. Further, the study aims to look at the process of privatisation and how 
the process affects the outcome. Lastly, the ambitious goal is to make a contribution to the 
current discussion on privatisation of water services. 
1.2 Global Water Resources  
Two-thirds of the earth’s surface is covered by water. Of the two and a half per cent of total 
water resources made up by fresh water only one per cent is available for use (UNEP 2008). 
According to an estimation made by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
two out of three people will experience water stress, below 1700 cubic metres of water per 
capita and year, by year 2025. Twenty-five countries in Africa alone are projected to 
experience water stress (UNICEF 2012).Water differs from other necessities as it is a scarce 
and excludable resource. Water infrastructure requires substantial and continued investments 
which creates considerable economies of scale and hinders competition (Covan, Noll & 
Shirley 2000). The United Nations (UN) estimates that eleven per cent of the world’s 
population lacks access to an improved water source, defined as “less than one kilometer 
away from its place of use and that it is possible to reliably obtain at least twenty liters per 
member of a household per day”. Due to programmes such as the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals significant improvements have been made in safe water access over the 
last two decades, with figures rising from seventy seven per cent in 1990 to eighty nine per 
cent in 2010. During the same period the use of piped water rose from forty five to fifty nine 
per cent. However, the increase in access is unevenly distributed between urban and rural as 
well as across continents. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) forty per cent of the population still 
lacks access to an improved water source (UNICEF 2012). 
1.3 Water in South Africa 
As the 30th driest country in the world, receiving little more than half of the estimated world 
average annual precipitation of 950 millimetres, South Africa is exposed to threats of changes 
in seasonal rainfalls and other disturbances in the water supply (DWAF 2003, UNEP 2009, 
WCRP 2008). The country is using most of its available surface- and groundwater resources 
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and is classified as acutely water stressed by the UN (UN Water 2006). South Africa’s 
National Water Research Strategy of 2004 projected demand to equal maximum sustainable 
water supply by 2025 if no action has been taken to reduce current demand and future 
consumption increase (National Treasury 2011). Severe droughts are affecting parts of the 
country leading to water shortages with considerable consequences not only for the 
population but also for the country’s industrial- and agricultural output. Further, there is a 
serious concern regarding the contamination of water as acid water from exploited mines 
leaks into rivers. There are strict regulations on how to remove and treat acid water but 
problems often arise when rain water fills deserted mines and the mining companies can no 
longer be held responsible (Basson). An even more alarming issue might be the deterioration 
of the country’s waste water infrastructure which causes sewage leaking into rivers before 
having been properly sanitised. 
1.3.1 Water provision in South Africa 
Following South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in the early 1990s the newly 
elected African National Congress (ANC) formulated a development programme to restore 
the financial system, eliminate poverty, increase employment, improve education and thereby 
give every South African equal rights and possibilities. The government presented the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to address the inequalities and backlogs 
in education, health care, housing, electricity and water. Twelve million South Africans were 
estimated to lack access to sufficient water and the programme emphasised the importance of 
everyone’s right to a secure water supply (South African Government 1994, AMCOW, 
Turton, Meissner, Mampane & Seremo 2004). In 1996 the government introduced the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy. A policy based on the neoliberal 
ideas that had been central also to the previous government. Growth was to be achieved 
through export, inflation control, and free-trade agreements as well as through privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises and reduce the role of the public sector (South African Government 
2003). Today, ninety one per cent of the South African population has access to an improved 
water source, in South Africa defined as the source being “within 200 meters of dwelling” 
(National Treasury 2011). Neither the UN’s definition nor the South African definition of 
access to an improved water source takes into account sustainability, quality or reliability of 
services but defines water access as having access to a water source protected from outside 
contamination. Despite the considerable effort aimed at improving infrastructure and reducing 
the high rate of nonrevenue water South Africa is still experiencing backlogs in areas 
neglected during apartheid (DWAF;b 1994). South African municipalities often lack 
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sufficient financial means and knowledge to ensure sustainability of operation, management 
and maintenance of water services (AMCOW). To address this, the minister of the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), Edna Molewa, and the Finance Minister, 
Pravin Gordhan, expressed a need for private sector participation during the 6th World Water 
Forum in 2012. 
1.3.1.1 Institutional framework 
The Department of Water Affairs is the “guardian” of South Africa’s water resources and is 
responsible for regulating and controlling the sector (DWAF 2003). The government owns the 
so called Water Boards, central to the provision of bulk and reticulation services as well as to 
the operation of infrastructure. Water Services Authorities (WSA) are defined as the local, 
metropolitan and district municipalities responsible for water provision. The constitutional 
obligation of the authorities is to provide water services for all within their boundaries. The 
WSA also nominates Water Services Providers (WSP). The WSP responsibility is the 
operation of bulk- or retail water services. The role of the WSP can, unlike the role of the 
WSA, be contracted out to an external provider such as a Water Board, a neighbouring 
municipality or a private actor (National Treasure 2011). 
1.3.1.2 Legislative framework 
Following the election in 1994 the government changed existing water laws and regulation. 
The new framework has been presented in the Constitution and in various acts and papers. 
The 1994 White Paper included a full cost-recovery plan, the water tariffs were to represent 
marginal-and capital costs, and the introduction of block tariffs (Morris, DWAF:a 1994). The 
Constitution established in 1996 states every South Africans fundamental right to access to 
sufficient and sustainable drinking water (South African Government 2009). The Water 
Services Act 108 of 1997 allows for cut-offs of water services due to non-payment under 
certain restrictions (DWAF 1997). The 1998 White Paper on Local Government includes 
different approaches of outsourcing services, including corporatisation, leases and 
concessions (South African Government 1998). Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 sets out 
the process of privatisation and opened up for extended private sector participation in 
municipal water services. Any actor, public or private, is eligible to provide services under the 
control of the municipality (South African Government 2000). The White Paper from 2000 
draws on the 1998 White Paper on Local Government as it further lays out the framework for 
outsourcing municipal services. To reach the goals set out in the RDP on infrastructure 
expansion and elimination of inequalities the paper encourages municipalities to turn to the 
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private sector. The paper defines some of the possible contracts with the private sector as 
follows; 
-Service contract: for a fee a service provider manages a specific section of services for a 
limited period of time, usually one to three years. 
-Management contract: the provider is responsible for overall management of services but not 
for financing usually for a period of three to five years. 
-Lease contract: The provider is responsible for overall management of services, commonly 
for a period of seven to fifteen years. The assets are leased to the provider for a fee, 
responsible for “operating, repairing and maintaining” of the assets. 
-Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) - contract: The provider assumes responsibility to 
“design, build, manage, operate, maintain, and repair “, at own cost. 
-Concession contract: The provider pays a fee to assume “management, operation, repair, 
maintenance, emplacement, design, construction, and financing of a municipal service facility 
or system” (South African Government 2000). 
1.4 Water privatisation 
1.4.1 History of water privatisation 
As the cities in Europe grew during the 19th century, so did the need for domestic water  
infrastructure. Contracts were entered between the state and the private sector where private 
actors were made responsible, not only for building, but also operating and management of 
water services. The private water sector is still dominated by the companies founded in 19th 
century Europe, such as the Compagnie Générale des Eaux (later Veolia) and Suez, first 
established as Lyonnaise des Eaux et de l’Éclairage. During the late 19th- and for most of the 
20th century responsibility for provision of water services was increasingly assumed by the 
public sector as the interests of the private sector did not coincide with those most socially 
beneficial (Prasad 2007, Swyngedouw 2005). During the late 1970s and early 1980s 
neoliberalism, globalisation, commoditisation and privatisation became increasingly popular 
terms in political discussions. Public services such as water, electricity, postal services and 
waste collection were considered as candidates for privatisation. Margaret Thatcher in the 
United Kingdom, Ronald Reagan in the United States and the World Bank (WB) promoted 
privatisation across the world during the 1980s. Thatcher reintroduced privatisation to the 
water sector by giving the private sector, not only responsibility for operation and 
management, but also ownership of public water assets. France privatised through affermages 
where the private sector was contracted for operation and bill collection while the 
municipalities remained in charge of planning and investment (Prasad 2007). 
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1.4.2 Water privatisation in developing countries; 1990 until today 
During the 1990s and through the 2000s privatisation became an increasingly common 
method used in the struggle to reach sustainable and effective water services in developing 
countries. A number of contracts were entered between the state and the private sector across 
Africa, Asia, Central Europe and Latin America including Guinea, India, the Philippines, 
Brazil, Bolivia and Argentina (Blanc & Botton 2012, Hall & Lobina 2002). In SSA contracts 
were entered with the private sector during the 1990s with a considerable increase of schemes 
towards the end of the decade. Countries including Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoir, Chad, Mali and 
South Africa all awarded private companies concession contracts and lease- and management 
contracts for provision of water (Bayliss 2001). A driving factor behind the global increase of 
schemes was the conditional loans and donations given by international finance institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WB and its private sector arm, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). Conditions often included privatisation of the 
receiving country’s water services (Hall & Lobina 2002).  The WB’s ground for the 
conditional loans is the belief in the private sector’s superior efficiency. The WB further 
regards the condition as a security for loans given (Prasad 2007). Several concerns have been 
raised as to the potential negative effect of privatisation, such as increased tariff levels, 
decreased water quality, lack if incentives for infrastructure expansion to the poor and 
corruptive behaviour of public authorities (Hall & Lobina 2002). The opposition to water 
privatisation from trade unions and citizens has been fierce which has lead to prevention or 
cancellations of privatisation schemes in numerous countries including Paraguay and Brazil 
(Blanc & Botton 2012, Hall & Lobina 2002). Further, as water systems are natural 
monopolies, privatisation requires efficient regulation and monitoring of contracts. Weak 
institutions in developing countries often lack incentives and instruments to regulate the often 
powerful, international private companies (Guriev & Megginson 2005, Danwood, Mzikenge 
& Chirwa). Arguments for privatisation, in addition to increased efficiency, include public 
sector failures of maintenance and investment as well as a lack of sufficient technical skills in 
developing countries (DWAF 2012). 
1.4.3 Water privatisation in South Africa 
Although the National Party had considered privatisation of water, and other state assets, to 
improve finances during the 1980s the fear of intense protests and absence of pressure from 
the WB the government only entered into privatisation schemes in the years leading up to the 
1994 election (Danwood, Mzikenge & Chirwa). A management contract was awarded Water 
and Sanitation South Africa (WSSA) in Queenstown and Stutterheim in 1992 and 1993 
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respectively. Another contract was awarded the same company for services in Fort Beaufort 
but due to the municipality’s inability to pay the fee the contract was after disputes cancelled. 
After the transformation to democracy in 1994 the African National Congress (ANC) entered 
into additional contracts with the private sector, including a thirty- year concession contract 
signed in 1999 with Siza Water Company and five other companies for services on the 
Dolphin Coast in eastern South Africa. In the same year Sembcorp Silulumanzi was awarded 
a contract to provide water services in the Greater Nelspruit Area (Sembcorp Silulumanzi 
2012). In 2001 the city of Johannesburg entered into a management contract with Suez 
Lyonnaise Des Eaux. The contract was not renewed after its expiration in 2006 (Johannesburg 
Water). The opposition, in unions and communities, to privatisation of water services in South 
Africa has been extensive and might have the limited number of privatisation schemes (Hall 
& Lobina 2002). 
Definition of privatisation 
Different forms of contracts all have different levels of private sector participation thus, 
influence, responsibility, risk- and control transfer (Danwood, Mzikenge & Chirwa). Due to 
the absence of right-out selling of assets the term privatisation might in the context of the 
South African water sector be interpreted not as a change in ownership but in governance. As 
all contracts with the private sector introduce competition, cost-recovery and change in 
efficiency to an extent, the term privatisation is in this thesis therefore broadened to include 
all private sector participation in water services provision (Ringskog & Idelovitch 1995). 
2. Theory and empirical evidence 
Theory on privatisation is extensive and dates back to Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations 
from 1776. Smith states that selling of public land would bring immediate and future revenues 
to “the crown” as the land would “become well improved and well cultivated” (Smith 1904). 
Later theory supporting privatisation emphasises gains in allocative- and productive 
efficiency, labour productivity, partly due an increase in lay-offs, and a stronger private 
sector. Macroeconomic gains are to be achieved through a reduction in governmental 
subsidies, increased funds and revenues through taxes, granted the private firm indeed 
performs better (Sheshinski & López-Calva 2003). Theory predicts that a perfectly 
competitive economy has a trade-off between efficiency, and thus economic growth, and 
equity. As developing countries can be assumed not perfectly competitive, and producing at a 
point underneath the production possibility frontier, there is reduced trade-off between the 
two. Depending on this initial point of production, privatisation may increase both equity and 
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efficiency. However, arguments against privatisation emphasises the problems that may arise 
as the public sector’s incentives and objectives might differ from the ones of the private 
sector. The public sector takes into account, what Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva in 
“Privatisation and Its Benefits: Theory and Evidence” call the “social view”, the social 
marginal cost. Privatisation of the market failure that is created by a natural monopoly must 
therefore be combined with a competitive bidding process, reforms assessing corruption and 
closing of the gap between interests of the consumer and the private sector through regulation 
(Kirkpatrick, Parker & Zhang 2004). Efficient regulation including tariff level and required 
investments, constrains the private firm without preventing the sought effects of inclusion. As 
mentioned in the introduction, problems arise in developing countries when weak institutions 
without sufficient political determination and means must regulate the private sector (Guriev 
& Megginson 2005). Thus, the actual impact of privatisation, on factors such as tariff levels, 
might not depend primarily on privatisation per se but on the privatisation process (Birdsall & 
Nellis 2003).  
Empirical evidence 
The literature on likelihood and impact of privatisation is extensive and covers case- and  
econometrical studies. However, the evidence is often weak and inconclusive. In ”A Duration 
Model Analysis of Privatisation of Municipal Water Services” Miralles (2009) uses panel data 
and a duration model to evaluate a municipal decision to privatise water services in Spain 
during a period from 1980 to 2002. The duration model allows Miralles to control for factors 
over a time t rather than, as in cross-sectional studies, at time t. The study finds that the 
motives behind privatisation changes with outside factors during the observed period. 
Miralles observes conservatives are more prone to privatisation in certain situations. The 
study also concludes that there is some evidence for the hypothesis of neighbouring 
municipalities having an influence on privatising decision due to initial economies of scale, 
called a ”dynamic neighboring effect” (Miralles 2009).  
Countries in Latin America were among the first to embark on privatisation on a 
larger scale. The study ”Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved 
Coverage? Empirical Evidence from Latin America” by Clarke, Kosec & Wallsten (2004) 
was conducted on water infrastructure coverage following privatisation. The study included 
services in Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil. Data from household surveys spanning over several 
years was used and a general increase in infrastructure coverage was observed, with a 
noticeable increase also in poor areas. The increase could not be concluded to have been 
caused by private sector participation however (Clarke, Kosec & Wallsten 2004). 
11 
 
The study ”Water privatisation in Africa: lessons from three case studies” 
conducted in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoir and Senegal found that labour productivity and water-
metering had increased as well as tariffs and initially, bill collection. The number of 
connections had not increased as much as expected, partly because people could not afford the 
connection fee (Bayliss 2001). Further, funds from donors had been used for investments but 
the rate of non revenue water (NRW) remains high.  
The ”Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child 
Mortality” by Galiani, Gertler & Schargrodsky (2005) highlights the importance of 
externalities resulting from an increase in access to piped water. The study is conducted in 
Argentina on waterborne diseases following the country’s privatisation scheme in the 1990s. 
The study looks at impact of privatisation on variables such as ”water leakages repaired per 
year” and ”water network extension” by using a difference-in-difference approach. An 
increase in infrastructure coverage following privatisation could be observed with a 
subsequent decrease in child mortality, especially in poor areas (Galiani, Gertler & 
Schargrodsky 2005).  
A case study emphasising the impact of regulation is ”A Tale of Two 
Concessions” by Wu and Malaluan (2006). Conducted in Manila, the study evaluates 
performance of water services providers in the city before and after privatisation. The city was 
to be divided into two areas and contracts were to be awarded to two different companies for 
provision in respective parts by means of a competitive bidding process through lowest tariff 
level. External factors, such as political influence, regulatory structure and unforeseen events 
were thus controlled for. With the assistance of the IFC and the Asian Development Bank a 
twenty five-year concession contract was awarded Maynilad Company for the western part of 
the city and Manila Water was awarded a similar contract for the eastern part. A few years 
into the contracts Maynilad Company had gone bankrupt whereas Manila Water, after initial 
struggles, was profitable. The study concluded that the potential success of privatisation was 
not limited to external factors but internal factors must also be considered. Wu and Malaluan 
declare that the contract-awarding process as well as the regulation can influence governance. 
The process of contract negotiations is also important for the potential success of 
privatisation. Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2004) argue a high number of renegotiations of 
contracts, as was the case of privatisation in Guniea, Cote d'Ivoir and Senegal, are 







The hypothesised effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables; privatised 
water services, access to piped water and tariff level are discussed below. Literature is 
referred to when applicable. 
Factors hypothesised to influence likelihood of privatisation 
The first column in Table 1 on page 15 represents the first regression on likelihood of 
privatisation. 
Hypothesis 1:  Ideology - a conservative steering party increases the probability of 
privatisation of municipal water services 
The reviewed literature on the impact of political ideology is inconclusive. Menard and 
Sussier (2000) emphasise the economic importance of choice of governance. However, the 
study by Miralles in 2009 (see Section 2) found conservatives to be more prone to 
privatisation when no other alternatives could be agreed upon. It is likely that other factors 
dominate ideology, as was arguably the case in South Africa following the end of apartheid 
when rapid improvements in water services were necessary in neglected areas. 
Hypothesis 2: Employment - a high employment rate increases or decreases the probability of 
privatisation of water services 
Privatisation might be equal parts a political and economical discussion. Privatisation is in 
theory and empirics is often associated with gains in worker productivity, partly due to lay-
offs. If the employment rate is high, politicians with a time horizon not exceeding the next 
election might be more willing to risk a decrease in the employment rate and therefore select 
to privatise. Such a decrease will have a negative impact on the municipality’s total income. 
However, the impact on overall municipal employment, and thus income level, might be 
marginal and only decrease short-term employment rate (Sheshinski & López-Calva 2003). 
Conversely, a low employment rate is arguably a proxy variable for financial distress. From a 
municipal point of view, the opportunity cost of public funds is high in times of financial 
distress whereas the opposite is true for times of reduced financial distress. A low opportunity 
cost decreases the likelihood of a municipality having privatised services (Auriol & Picard). 
From the perspective of the private sector however, economic uncertainty would reduce the 
likelihood of entering into an agreement with the public sector for two reasons mainly. First 
of all a public sector in financial distress might not have secure funding for such a scheme and 
second of all the willingness of the private sector to invest in new schemes in times of 
13 
 
uncertainty is arguably lower than in times of financial boom. It is difficult to predict which of 
the mentioned effects is dominant. 
Hypothesis 3: Population density- a densely populated city increases the probability of 
privatisation of water services 
The potential revenue in a densely populated city is higher per metre of piping, making 
private sector interest more likely. On the contrary, high population density might be 
indicative of a larger city. It is likely that larger cities attract more skilled politicians with 
internal instruments to utilise to improve services rather than privatisation. The positive effect 
of potential revenue is believed to be the prevailing however. 
Factors hypothesised to influence access to piped water 
The second column in Table 1 below represents the second regression that will be run on 
access to piped water. The variable of main interest is privatised. 
Hypothesis 4: Privatised- privatised water services increases access to piped water 
The literature reports privatisation as having varying effects on infrastructure coverage, often 
believed to be dependent on incentives and regulation. The hypothesis is an increase in access 
to piped water for two reasons mainly. Firstly, increased infrastructure coverage leads to 
increased revenue in financially profitable areas which is an incentive for private firms to 
invest in infrastructure (Auriol & Picard). Secondly, as concern has been raised as to the 
public sector’s competence to maintain and expand infrastructure in South Africa the 
municipalities might be inclined to involve the private sector for technical assistance 
(AMCOW). 
Hypothesis 5: Income and income squared- higher income increases access to piped water 
Persons with higher income will to a larger extent pay the fixed cost of connection. Further,  
investments in infrastructure can be financed by tariffs to a larger extent in high-income areas 
(Auriol & Picard). The income effect is expected to decline with higher levels of income. 
Hypothesis 6: Population density- a high population density increases access to piped water 
For every metre of piping a larger number of persons gain access to piped water in densely 
populated areas compared to the ones with lower population density. Potential revenue is 
therefore higher in densely populated areas and costs for maintenance and investment per 
metre of piping per person is lower. The incentive for investments in infrastructure in a highly 
populated area must thus be higher than in the opposite. It should be noted however that as the 
size of a city grows so does the likelihood of illegal connections and levels of NRW and 
risking the financial sustainability of services. 
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Hypothesis 7: Informal dwelling- a large number of informal dwellings increases access to 
piped water 
Informal dwelling can be expected to be positively correlated with population density. In 
areas with a large number of informal households the cost per connection is drastically 
reduced. However, backlogs have historically been a problem in areas with a large number of 
informal dwellings and backlogs are still prevalent. The actual impact is difficult to predict. 
Factors hypothesised to influence tariff level 
The third column in Table 1 below represents the third regression that will be run on tariff 
level. The variable of main interest is privatised. 
Hypothesis 8: Privatised- privatised water services leads to a higher tariff level 
The reviewed literature, including Bayliff’s study in Africa in 2001, establishes a positive 
correlation between privatisation and higher tariff levels. The hypothesis is thus a higher tariff 
level in municipalities with privatised water services. Theory predicts that both sectors have a 
competitive advantage; the public sector through not paying governmental fees and taxes and 
the private sector through specialisation and gains in efficiency. However, the private sector 
has incentives different to the ones of public sector to recover full cost of production and 
maximise profit. The public sector must weigh attempts to recover cost with a tariff level that 
is socially beneficial. The predicted increase is dependent on the initial level of the 
municipality’s cost-recovery, the contract and the regulation. 
Hypothesis 9: Population density- high population density leads to a lower tariff level 
The argument for a decrease in tariff level in densely populated areas follows the arguments 
made in hypotheses 3 and 7 for the probability of privatisation and infrastructure coverage 
respectively. A larger number of people share the cost of operation, the cost per tap and 
household is reduced, and thus tariff level to recover costs. 
Hypothesis 10: Water availability- availability of water leads to a lower tariff level 
According to DWAF recommendations, tariffs are to be set higher in areas with poor water 
availability to control demand. The cost of dams and extraction will increase if water is scarce 
as will the required investments, skill and research. Presumably, an area with a ratio of 
rainfall to runoff below average requires higher levels of these three factors compared to an 
area with an above average ratio. Higher cost of operation is expected to have a positive 
influence on tariff level (Ménard & Saussier 2000). 
 
To summarise, three regressions will be run with privatised water services, access to piped 
water and tariff level as the dependent variables. The aim of the first regression is to evaluate 
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the probability of a municipality having private water services. The second regression seeks to 
assess the relationship between privatised water services and access to piped water. The third 
regression will estimate privatised water services impact on water tariffs. Below follows a 
summary of the hypothesised signs. 
 




Data has been collected during a three-month field study in Cape Town, South Africa from 
January to April of 2013. The main data set has been obtained through DataFirst at the 
University of Cape Town. The data is derived from the 2007 Community Survey, a ten per 
cent random sample survey conducted in February of 2007 by Statistics South Africa. The 
survey covered all nine provinces and is the latest nationwide survey available at the time of 
the study (Statistics South Africa 2007). The survey questions include household 
characteristics such as income, information on type of dwelling and access to basic services. 
Of South Africa’s approximately 230 local municipalities, 101 are included in 
the study. In 82 of the local municipalities water services are public and 19 have entered into 
contracts with private actors. Information regarding private sector participation is obtained 
through the local municipalities as well as through contact with contracted private companies. 
All public municipalities where the WSP has been verified are included. Due to the limited 
private sector participation in the water services sector all municipalities with confirmed 
contracts with the private sector before February of 2007 are included. As a few contracts 
were initiated in January 2007 it is likely the results underestimate the possible effect of 
privatisation of water services. The selection of municipalities is a cause for concern as the 
Independent variables Privatised Access piped water Tariff level
Privatised - positive positive
Conservative positive - -
Employment positive - -
Income - positive -
Income^2 - negative -
Population density positive positive negative
Informal dwelling - negative -
Water availability - - negative
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decision to privatise in the observed municipalities might be correlated with some unobserved 
characteristic affecting probability and impact of privatisation (Wooldridge 2008). 
The result of the 2006 Municipal Election has been provided after contact with 
the independent Electoral Commission (Electoral Commission 2012). Due to data limitations 
figures on tariff levels dates from July 2011 to July 2012 and is collected through annual 
municipal reports. Data on tariff levels is only available for 50 of the 101 municipalities. 
Figures on aridity are obtained through UNEP. As the figures on aridity are on provincial 
level the variables explanatory value can be considered relatively weak but as water 
availability is expected to be important the variable is included (UNEP 2006). A summary of 
the data follows in Table 2 below. 
 




The Probit model 
The explanatory variable of privatisation is a binary variable, taking on the value of 0 or 1, the  
Probit model is used. The Logit model and the Probit model are both extensively used to 
evaluate the marginal effects of explanatory variables on a dependent binary variable. Despite 
the two models similarity the Probit model is often preferred by economists, partly because of 
the Probit model’s assumption of normal distribution of the errors. The Probit model produces 
robust estimates and enables controlling for factors affecting privatisation (Wooldridge 2008). 
The parameters will be estimated using the maximum likelihood of success. The interpretation 
will be the maximum likelihood of privatisation given the three independent variables of 
Observations %  of sample
Privatised 101 18.8
Access piped 100 60.9
Conservative 101 5.6
Employment 101 48.7
Informal dwelling 101 9.4
Water availability 101 18.5
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Tariff 137.9 86 37 436
Population density 63.4 101.3 1 747
Income 7256 4811 1341 35706
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conservative, employment and population density. Below is the true model on which the 
regression will be run where  refers to probability and   is the Cumulative Distribution 
Function of the standard normal distribution. 
 	 = ⃓	=  (+    + ) 
 
 
Ordinary Least Squares method 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is suitable to evaluate the effects of privatisation 
on the continuous variables of tariff level and access to piped water while controlling for other 
factors (Wooldridge 2008). The regressors hypothesised to influence access to piped water are 
privatised, income, income and population density. Below is the true model on which the 
regression will be run. 
 			 										=  + +  +   	+ +  
 
 
The third and final regressors, expected to influence tariff level, are privatised, population 
density and water availability. Below is the true model on which the regression will be run. 




To enable the study there are some cautions and assumptions to be observed, apart from the 
assumptions implied by using the Probit model and the OLS method. First of all, a few issues 
arise as the data set is cross-sectional as a cross-sectional study only enables an analysis of 
why services are privatised at time t. Although the contracts have been entered over a twenty 
year period the privatisation decisions need to be evaluated as if made at the time of the 
survey, based on steering party, employment rates and population density at that time. 
Therefore the rather strong assumptions must be made of a continuous privatisation decision 
by steering politicians (Miralles 2009). In practice the option to reverse a privatisation 
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decision is highly unlikely. It follows that the impact of the independent regressors on access 
to piped water and tariff levels at time t must be assumed to have been a result of 
privatisation. Secondly, it is difficult to with certainty claim despite statistical significance, 
that privatisation is the cause of an observed difference in access to piped water and tariff 




Privatised is a binary variable taking on the value of 1 in case of “success”, private water 
services, and the value of 0 in case of public water provision. As mentioned above the 
assumption of a continuous privatisation decision in the municipalities must be made 
(Miralles 2009). Further, the variable might not estimate probability and impact of 
privatisation as a number of contracts were entered only a few months before the survey was 
conducted. This might be especially important to consider when analysing the impact of 
privatisation on access to piped water. 
3.4.2 Access to piped water 
The dependent variable in the second regression is access to piped water, measured as the 
ratio of the number of people with access to piped water and total population in each 
municipality. More than ninety per cent of the South African population has access to piped 
water according to the country’s definition (National Treasury 2011). To enable a comparison 
between public and private services the definition of availability in the study is therefore 
restricted to tap being inside dwelling or yard. An increase in access to piped water is 
associated with many positive externalities. High infrastructure coverage not only drastically 
reduces time spent to collect water but also affects factors such as the risk of spreading of 
waterborne diseases and reduces child-mortality (Galiani, Gertler & Schargrodsky 2005). To 
estimate the impact of privatised water services on access is thus important, not only from an 
economical perspective. 
3.4.3 Tariff level 
Tariff level is a continuous variable based on data from each municipality on its tariff level 
from July 2011 to July 2012. The pricing of water is very complex for several reasons, not 
least because water is a natural resource and a necessity. As water tariffs in South Africa are 
to be charged in increasing block rates to control demand, the average water bill per month for 
an average sized household has been calculated for each municipality, using average normal 
consumption of 250 litres per person and day for the average household of 3.6 people 
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(Statistics South Africa 2007, DWAF;b 1994). The calculation will enable a tariff comparison 
between public and private service delivery regardless of household consumption and 
household size. It is difficult to draw any conclusions on a causal relationship between tariff 
level and privatisation as a possible increase in the former might not be due to private sector 
participation but rather due to corruptive behaviour during the contract awarding process. 
Tariff levels determine not only if access to piped water is affordable but also the consumption 
pattern of the population. Higher tariff levels are expected to reduce consumption, which 
makes tariff setting an important tool for the local governments in the water scarce country of 
South Africa. More aggravating, a high tariff level might induce household to choose to not 
connect to piped water but rather to use an unsafe water source. An attempt of evaluating the 
impact of privatised services on the dependent variable of tariff level is therefore of high 
importance. 
3.4.4 Conservative 
Conservative is constructed as a binary variable taking on the value of 1 if the municipal 
steering party is conservative and 0 for all other ideologies. 
Socio-economic variables 
3.4.5. Employment 
The continuous variable of employed is based on data on the employment rate in every 
municipality. Employed has been extended to include all options in the survey except 
”unemployed”, that is “employed” and ”not economically active”. 
3.4.6. Income 
Income is constructed as an ordinal variable, taking on the value 1, “low” to 12, “high”. The  
variable is also included as squared to enable observation of the change in piped water access 
as income increases. Income is included to control for the difference of infrastructure 
coverage in high-and low income municipalities that is not due to privatisation. 
3.4.7 Population density 
The continuous variable has been constructed by dividing municipal population figures from 
the 2011 Census survey by its municipal area, measured in square kilometres (Statistics South 
Africa 2011).  
3.4.8 Informal dwelling 
The continuous variable of informal dwelling is based on the number of informal dwellings in 





3.4.9 Water availability 
Water availability is constructed as a binary variable taking on the value of 1 for a ratio 
rainfall to runoff above average and the value of 0 for a below average ratio. It would be 
preferable to have access to continuous or ordinal data but only binary data has been obtained. 
Further, data on water availability has only been obtained on provincial level which will affect 
the validity of the variable (UNEP 2006). According to UNEP, South Africa is at risk of being 
among the countries to be most severely affected by climate change (UNEP 2013). Water 
availability is therefore believed to be an important driver of cost and included despite 
limitations in data. 
Factors not included in the analysis 
It is not possible to control for all the factors influencing a municipality’s decision to 
privatise, partly due to limitations in data and partly due to the variable being unobservable. 
Some of the excluded, but believed influential, factors are listed below.  
An important factor in determining impact of privatisation is quality of services, 
measured as number of stops per month and time for reparation. However, there were no 
questions on interruptions in the 2007 Community Survey.  
A factor behind privatisation in other countries has been pressure from the WB 
and other international organisations (see Section 1).  
The age of the infrastructure can be expected to determine cost of investments, 
accessibility and quality of services. 
 Labour movements hold a strong position in South Africa and have had a 
negative effect on the probability of privatisation (see Section 1). 
Lastly, theory and literature have emphasised the considerable impact of internal 
factors on the performance of water services providers. The culture and governance in 
municipalities as well as in private companies highly influence the outcome (for example, see 
Wu & Malaluan in Section 2). 
4. Results and discussion 
The results below show the probability of privatised services and privatised services 
subsequent impact on access to piped water and the tariff level conditional on certain 
independent variables at the point of time of the survey. The coefficients of the regression on 
probability of privatisation are estimated using marginal effects. The second and third 
regressions on access to piped water and tariff level respectively are included with robust and 
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non-robust standard errors. The robust standard errors in regression 3 should be interpreted 
with caution however as only 50 municipalities are included in the regression. 
 




Results of regression on privatised water services 
The first regression was run on the probability of a municipality having 
privatised services using a Probit model. As Miralles (2009) remakrs, a rather strong 
assumption of a constant decision-making on privatisation is required to determine why 
municipal services were privatised at the time of the survey. That is, a politician has the 
option of reversing a decision to privatise, which is not always possible in practice. The first 
regressor is conservative. The coefficient is negative, contrary to the predicted. The 
coefficient implies that conservative generates a lower likelihood of a municipality having 
privatised water services by 1.83 ∗ 10 percentage points. However, the coefficient is 
insignificant and the hypothesis of conservative having an impact on likelihood of 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 3
Probit marginal effects OLS non-robust st. err. OLS robust st. err. OLS non-robust st. err. OLS robust st.err.
Independent variables Privatised Access piped water Access  piped water Tariff leve l Tariff level
Privatised - 7.83*10 -^7 7.83*10 -^7 0.00086 0.00086
- (0.502) (0.353) (0.889) (0.862)
Conservative        -1.83*10 -^6      - - - -
(0.976) - - - -
Socio-economic variables
Employment        0.0000948      - - - -
 (0.077)* - - - -
Income - -2.95*10 -^6 -2.95*10 -^6 - -
- (0.001)*** (0.000)*** - -
Income^2 - 3,67*10 -^7 3,67*10 -^7 - -
- (0.002)*** (0.005)*** - -
Population density       0.0007968      -0,0000411 -0,0000411 0.39 0.39
(0.156) (0.089)* (0.010)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Informal dwelling - 6.87*10 -^6 6.87*10 -^6 - -
- (0.368) (0.261) - -
Water availability - - - -0.018 -0.018
- - - (0.039)** (0.013)**
Municipalities 101 100 100 50 50
Explanation: in parentheses standard error:***significant 1%,**significant 5%,*significant 10%
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privatisation is rejected in the regression. Thus, no conclusions can be drawn on ideology 
having any influence on likelihood of privatisation in the sampled municipalities. This is 
conclusive with several studies where only a few indications of privatisation being more or 
less likely in conservative municipalities have been found (Miralles 2009, Ménard & Saussier 
2000). 
The second hypothesis of employment having an effect on likelihood of 
privatised water services is not rejected. The coefficient on employment is positive and 
significant at the 10 per cent level. The positive and significant coefficient indicates that at the 
time of the survey employment rate had a positive impact on the probability of privatisation in 
the sampled municipalities. The second hypothesis predicted two different effects of high 
employment rates, one positive and one negative. It would seem the first prediction, of 
politicians being more willing to privatise if employment rates were high, dominated the 
hypothesis of opportunity cost in this sample of municipalities at the time of the survey. The 
evidence should be viewed with caution however as the coefficient is only significant at the 
rather weak 10 per cent level. 
The third hypothesis predicted population density has a positive impact on 
probability of privatisation. The coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. In the 
sample of municipalities, population cannot be claimed to have affected the likelihood of 
privatisation. 
Results of regression on access to piped water 
The second regression was run on access to piped water using the OLS method. The 
independent variable of privatised is of main interest. The coefficient was hypothesised to be 
positive according to theory’s prediction and empirical evidence of private sector’s different 
incentives to those of the public. The resulting coefficient implies that privatised services, 
holding the other independent factors constant, would increase the number of people with 
access to piped water by 7.83 ∗ 10 persons per square metre. The small coefficient 
constitutes a marginal economic significance. The estimated coefficient is positive, however, 
the result does not support the hypothesis as the coefficient is insignificant. Thus, in the 
sample, the municipalities with privatised water services were at the time of the survey not 
associated with increased infrastructure coverage. The result does not follow the conclusion 
on increased infrastructure coverage due to privatisation made by Galiani, Gertler and 
Schargrodsky (2005) in the study on child mortality.  
The coefficient on income is negative, contrary to the hypothesis. The 
coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level. In this sample, increased income leads to a 
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decrease in infrastructure coverage, which is not the expected outcome and inconclusive with 
previous evidence obtained by Bayliss (2001) of a positive relationship between income and 
piped water. The coefficient on income squared is positive, which is the opposite sign of the 
hypothesised. The coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level. 
The third variable, population density, was expected to be positive as cost per 
metre of piping decreases with increased density. The null-hypothesis is rejected as the 
negative coefficient is statistically significant, albeit just, at the 10 per cent level. In the 
sample of municipalities at the time of the survey, population density had a negative impact 
on the number of connections. The evidence is weak however and the economic importance is 
marginal. 
The fourth and last independent variable is informal dwelling. The hypothesis 
was inconclusive on the effect of informal dwelling on access to piped water. The estimated 
coefficient is positive but insignificant. Thus, the number of informal dwellings cannot be 
concluded to have any impact on infrastructure coverage in the sampled municipalities. 
Results of regression on tariff level 
The dependent variable of the third regression is tariff level and estimated using the OLS 
method. The main independent variable of interest is privatised, as in the second regression. 
The hypothesis, drawn on theory and literature, predicted a higher tariff level in municipalities 
with private water services. The regression produced a positive variable implying a tariff level 
increase by R 0.00086 if private water services provision, holding the other factors constant. 
The economic significance is again marginal. Assuming a municipality with private water 
services, water availability above average and population density at mean would be associated 
with a tariff increase by 0.0035 per cent relative to the base group of public water services 
provision. However, the variable is insignificant. The null-hypothesis of privatised having no 
impact on tariff level is not rejected in this study. Thus, in the sampled municipalities, 
empirics do not coincide with theory and no conclusion can be drawn of an impact of 
privatised water services on tariff level. 
The second regressor, population density, was expected to have a negative 
impact on tariff level. The estimated coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level. The 
hypothesis of population density affecting tariff level can thus not be rejected. Contrary to the 
hypothesised negative effect, the impact is positive. For the municipalities included it can thus 
be concluded that the tariff level for an average household with a normal monthly 
consumption of water increases as population density increases. 
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The third and last independent variable is water availability. Hypothesis 10 
predicted a negative impact on water tariff due to lower cost of “production”. The hypothesis 
is not rejected; the estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Above average water availability has a negative impact on tariff level in the sampled 
municipalities. 
Discussion 
The first regression assessed what factors influenced the likelihood of the sampled 
municipalities having privatised water services at one point in time. The second and the third 
regression evaluated the difference between the sampled municipalities with privatised water 
provision and the sampled municipalities with public services, at one point in time. The 
results are to various extents in line with theory’s prediction, empirical evidence and the 
hypothesised effects. Several variables were insignificant and no impact on the dependent 
variables could be concluded. Further, the economic impact of the significant variables can be 
questioned.  
 
Some caution should be taken when interpreting and applying the results. First of all, it is 
important to note the difficulty in comparing performance of services provision between the 
public sector and the private. The two sectors act under different laws and regulation, which 
has been concluded to highly influence privatisation schemes. 
Secondly, the independent variables included in the regressions are very limited. 
The aim of the first regression was to predict the impact of conservative, employment and 
population density on the likelihood of privatisation, where only employment was statistically 
significant. Holding privatised constant, it is highly likely a variable such as economic shock 
influences both a potential decision to privatise and the variable of employment rate. The 
same can be argued for the second regression where the omitted variable of topography is 
likely to be a driver of both access to piped water and water availability. In regression three, 
most of the variation in dependent variables cannot be explained by income, informal 
dwelling and population density. It is probably that factors such as age of infrastructure and 
quality of water is correlated to both privatised and tariff level. The unobserved factor of 
regulation is also believed to influence infrastructure coverage, tariff level and several of the 
regressors. To omit causal variables produces a positive or negative bias in one or several of 
the included regressors. It is possible to determine the direction but not the size of the bias. 
For instance, the variable of employment is expected to be negative biased due to the 
exclusion of the variable economic shock. Economic shock has arguably a positive influence 
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on a privatisation decision as the opportunity cost of public funds increases in times of 
financial distress. Further, economic shock is likely negatively correlated with the variable of 
employment rate. Omitting the variable of economic shock thus causes the included variable 
of employment to be too small on average. Determining the direction of a bias is only a 
solution to some extent, to get an accurate coefficient would require further data, either on the 
variables omitted or if such data is unavailable; suitable proxy- or interaction variables. 
Thirdly, it is further difficult to conclude that privatisation causes no actual 
improvement in access to piped water or that privatisation of water services has no impact of 
tariff level. As it is in the political interest to privatise municipalities where it would be most 
beneficial but in the private sector interest to invest in a municipality with high infrastructure 
coverage, a positive coefficient in regression two might be due to reverse causality. Thus, an 
estimated positive effect of privatised services on infrastructure coverage cannot be 
determined to be caused by privatisation of services. There are at least two issues present in 
this study that requires assessment before any causal relationship between the independent 
and the dependent variables can be claimed. The first is a careful selection process to enable a 
comparison between municipalities with similar characteristics. The municipalities included 
have not been selected on the basis of characteristics but rather on information available due 
to time constraint, which is likely to have caused a selection bias. The second solution would 
be to use a large data set which would enable controlling for multiple variables likely to 
influence the dependent variables (Guriev & Megginson 2005). The two alternatives above, 
by themself or combined would produce less biased results. As this study includes neither of 
the two the results should be interpreted and implemented with caution.  
Lastly, as mentioned above the obtained results coincide to varying degrees with 
the ones predicted by theory and empirical evidence. The variables of main interest; 
conservative in the regression 1 and privatised in regression 2 and 3 were all insignificant. 
Thus, no conclusion can be made on any impact of the three independent variables on the 
respective dependent variables. The findings of this study are to some extent applicable to the 
limited number of sampled municipalities. Validity outside the premises unique to this study 
is difficult to argue. Further studies are required to potentially find and establish a significant, 
causal relationship between factors influencing a decision to privatise and the subsequent 
impact. Evidence is important as access to piped water brings countless benefits just as an 
increase in tariff level might bring an equal number of disadvantages for the population. 
Access to piped water brings great externalities through reduced risk of spreading of 
waterborne diseases as well as a lower rate of child mortality (Galiani, Gertler &  
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Schargrodsky 2005). A high tariff level might exclude people from access (Bayliss 2001). A 
discussion on privatisation might therefore be altogether above that of both political and 
economical arguments. 
5. Conclusion 
Despite an increasing world population effectively reduces the amount of water per person, 
access to sufficient water remains a local and not a global issue. Over the last decades 
governments have in attempts to address severe backlogs in water infrastructure and costly 
subsidies converted water from being a human right to a commodity. People across the all 
continents have been left relishing the benefits or suffering the downside as privatisation has 
meant increased water infrastructure coverage, increased tariff levels and increased service 
quality, as well as the opposite. South Africa has identified water access and affordability as 
crucial contributing factors as the country strives to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities. 
This study was conducted using a cross-sectional data set on a limited number of South 
African municipalities. The results imply that a municipality steered by a conservative party 
was no more likely to privatise water services than a municipality ruled by a non-conservative 
party. Evidence of employment rate having a positive effect on the probability of privatisation 
was found however. The results provided no indication of privatised water services affecting 
access to piped water or tariff levels. The results are difficult to apply however as the data set 
inflicted restrictions. The limited number of municipalities with private water supply makes 
the results further difficult to use to explain probability of privatisation and the differences in 
access to piped water and tariff levels in municipalities with public water provision and 
municipalities with private water provision. In year 2025 maximum sustainable water supply 
is predicted to meet demand in South Africa if no action is taken to reduce current demand 
and future consumption. As reliable and affordable water services are the foundation for the 
life of every South African as well as the foundation for the country’s industry, further 
research need to be conducted on how to best manage and guard South Africa’s scarce and 
declining water resources. It might just be that a regulated and mature collaboration between 









Further studies on water privatisation in South Africa are important and could provide 
guidance in decision making processes. The results of the 2011 Census are available which 
would provide data on the entire population. A number of municipalities have privatised their 
water services since 2007 which would further improve the foundation of the study. The 
survey includes questions on service interruptions which enables analysis of quality. Both 
factors would provide more valid results than the study conducted. It would also be valuable 
to obtain data on terrain, such as topography. The variable on terrain included, the binary 
variable of water availability, includes no real information and as water availability is 
believed to be increasingly stressed in the future it is an important variable to consider. 
Moreover, as the outcome of privatisation is expected to vary greatly with type of contract, 
future studies might focus on the impact of different forms of privatisation. To evaluate the 
impact of various degrees of private sector participation, such as management-, lease and 
concessions contracts, would be very useful guidance for South African municipalities in their 
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